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Introduction
Recent empirical studies on financial contracting reveal that covenants strengthen creditor rights and significantly affect corporate investment (Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2009; Demiroglu and James, 2010) , capital structure (Roberts and Sufi, 2009; Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2012) , and operating efficiency and stock price performance (Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2012) . These results suggest that covenants in corporate debt contracts are binding. They also highlight the importance of carefully allocating creditor control in financial contracts. While those studies find that debt covenants are effective ex post, it is important to determine whether the allocation of control rights is efficient ex ante. In this paper, we attempt to answer the question: Are covenants strategically designed to define an efficient allocation of control rights ex ante?
Financial contracting theories indicate that the rationale for covenants is controlling agency conflicts and defining control rights. Smith and Warner (1979) argue that covenants are used to control the bondholder-shareholder conflict to lower the agency costs of debt. (Aghion and Bolton, 1992) theoretically demonstrate that when firm owner is rent seeking, debt can be the optimal contract. Their theory explains that state contingency control right allocation is optimal in their setting. Bond covenant is therefore proposed in their paper to allocate control right in debt contracts. In this paper, we investigate empirically how agency conflicts shape the structure of bond covenants. We find robust evidence that heightened agency conflicts increase the stringency of covenants in bond contracts. Our results suggest that the potential conflicts between bondholders and shareholders are preemptively considered in bond covenants.
To measure the restrictiveness of covenants, we follow Billett, King, and Mauer (2007) and divide bond covenants into 15 categories. These categories of covenants fall into four major groups, including payout restrictions, investment restrictions, financing restrictions, and event-driven covenants. We then add up the total number of categories to construct a covenant index approximating the level of protection for bondholders. As the value of the covenant index increases, bond covenants become more restrictive.
To approximate the agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders, we create two measures of institutional blockholding: NL5 is the percentage of a company's shares owned by all institutional investors who hold no less than 5% of total shares outstanding, and Top5 is the percentage of shares held by the five largest institutional owners of the firm. Concentrated institutional ownership strengthens shareholder control, because large institutional investors are incentivized and better able to monitor the management. Active monitoring aligns the interest of the management with those of shareholders at large or with those of blockholders in particular. Enhanced shareholder rights would then exacerbate bondholder concerns over the agency conflicts. Influenced by blockholders, firms may undertake high-risk projects that maximize blockholders' interest instead of firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) , or forgo profitable investment opportunities due to the debt-overhang problem (Myers, 1977) . To mitigate these agency costs, firms may find it beneficial to enclose protective covenants in the bond contract, because giving creditors more control rights facilitates debt financing and helps to lower the borrowing cost. Empirical studies also find that firm operating and stock price performance improve following violations of covenants (Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2012) .
Thus, the agency view predicts that more concentrated institutional ownership increases the restrictiveness of bond covenants.
While concentrated outside ownership strengthens shareholder rights, it could also bring about shared benefits to bondholders. With effective monitoring, blockholders can force management to take value-enhancing actions (Barclay and Holderness, 1992; Huddart, 1993) . Consequently, there would be less need for bond covenants when efficient blockholder-monitoring provides shared benefits to bondholders. Thus, the shared-benefit hypothesis predicts a negative effect of blockholding on the tightness of covenants. The foregoing analysis indicates bondholder and shareholder interests can either align or diverge, as reflected in a statement by Moody's Investor Service: "While there is substantial overlap between creditor and shareholder interests, there also are important potential conflicts." Ultimately, the net effect of institutional blockholding on bond covenants remains an empirical question.
Our empirical investigation shows that the agency channel plays a dominant role in determining the relation between covenants and institutional blockholding. Using 10,513 bonds issued from 1979 to 2008, we find that institutional blockholding has a significant and positive effect on covenant protection. This effect persists after we control for firm characteristics, bond attributes, and credit market conditions. These findings suggest that stronger shareholder control escalates the potential shareholder-bondholder conflicts and, consequently, leads to more stringent covenant protection.
To test the robustness of our baseline results, we employ a different blockholding measure, based on the Herfindahl index, to account for the effect of total institutional ownership, and an alternative estimation equation, the ordered probit model, to fit the ordinal nature of the covenant index. To address concerns that may arise when a firm issues multiple bonds over the sample period, we conduct regressions of covenants on blockholding at the firm level. In all above robustness checks, we find similar results to those obtained in baseline regressions.
To identify the causal effect of block ownership and mitigate the endogeneity concern, our main approach is to employ instrumental-variable regressions. Our instrument for institutional blockholding is stock liquidity. This can be justified on the basis of the following arguments. First, liquidity has a direct effect on institutional blockholding because it reduces transaction costs, making it easier for blockholders to trade shares. Second, liquidity is unlikely to have a direct effect on the covenants of debt contract. The bond security is relatively illiquid, so that bond contracting terms are unlikely determined by stock liquidity. Existing theories indicate that liquidity facilitates shareholder governance either through blockholder intervention (Maug, 1998) or through the threat of blockholder exit (Edmans, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011) . Thus, liquidity only has an indirect effect on covenants through enhanced shareholder control. Two-stage least square regressions show that institutional blockholding still has a significantly positive effect on covenant protection, and this effect is even stronger than that in the baseline regressions.
To further identify the channel through which institutional blockholding affects bond covenants, we carry out regression analysis for sub groups of covenants and for different types of institutional investors. In our first test, we examine the effect of blockholding on different groups of covenants. Although the 15 covenant categories are all interrelated, there is some heterogeneity in the intended purposes across different sub groups of covenant categories. We break down the covenant index and focus on two major groups of covenant categories. The first group includes restrictions on payouts and investment activities, and the second group comprises restrictions on financing activities. We expect that the two groups of covenants are related in different ways to agency conflicts between bondholders and shareholders. Payout and investment restrictions are designed to directly address shareholder-bondholder conflicts, while financing restrictions are mainly designed to mitigate claim dilution. Thus, covenants restricting payouts and investment activities should depend more on institutional blockholding, while financing-related covenants are less affected by concentrated institutional ownership. Our regression results on different types of covenant categories are consistent with this conjecture.
In our second test, we investigate the effect of institutional blockholding among different types of investors. We hypothesize that the agency problem is more acute when institutional shareholding is concentrated among active investors. If the positive effect of institutional blockholding on covenant protection is mainly driven by agency concerns, then we expect the effect to become stronger for active investors. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that the positive effect of institutional blockholding on covenant protection is much larger for active institutional investors than for passive institutional shareholders.
Similar to investor activism, the investment horizon also has differential implications on the bondholder-shareholder relationship. On the one hand, concentrated ownership allows shortterm blockholders to exercise undue influence over management to engage in opportunistic activities, such as investing in short-run and high-risk projects, and thus elevates bondholdershareholder conflicts. On the other hand, long-term institutional blockholders may protect the interest of bondholders by considering the firm's future financing needs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and long-term value (Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb, 2003) . Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003) find that shareholding by founding families reduces bond yields, which suggests that long-term investors' interest may be aligned with bondholders' interests. We find empirical results that are consistent with the foregoing analysis. Institutional blockholding by shortterm investors is associated with tighter bond covenant restrictions, while the positive effect of ownership concentration among long-term institutional blockholders is greatly attenuated and statistically insignificant.
In the last part of our empirical investigation, we consider whether covenants help to reduce the offering yields of bonds. We find that, exposed to intensified agency conflicts, bondholders charge a higher yield for firms with more institutional blockholding. This confirms the finding in Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) that blockholding was associated with higher offering yield spreads. Our additional analysis shows that covenants help to alleviate the impact of agency conflicts on yield spreads, and the beneficial effect of covenants is stronger for investmentgrade bonds.
Our paper is closely related to the literature that examines the determinants of bond covenants. Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2003) argue that bond issuers' use of covenants weighs the benefit of mitigating agency problems and the cost of reducing flexibility. The authors show that high-growth firms are less likely to include dividend or debt issuance restrictions in their bond contracts to preserve future flexibility. Malitz (1986) finds that small firms and highly levered issuers are more likely to include restrictive covenants in their bond contracts to reduce the financing cost. Billett, King, and Mauer (2007) find that covenant protection increases with growth option, debt maturity, and leverage. Additionally, covenant protection significantly reduces the negative relation between leverage and growth opportunities, and thus it can mitigate the agency costs of debt for high-growth firms. Bengtsson (2011) finds that covenants are in place to overcome a conflict of interest that arises from debt-like contractual features of a venture capitalist's preferred stock. Closet to our paper is Chava, Kumar, and Warga (2010) , who investigate the effects of managerial entrenchment and fraud on different types of covenants and find that managerial agency risk influences the use of covenants.
Our paper contributes to the literature on debt covenants in two important ways. First, we find that the potential conflicts between shareholders and bondholders are preemptively considered in designing the structure of debt covenants. Although an increasing number of studies show that the debt contract is ex post effective following a violation of covenants, it is less known empirically whether the use of tight covenants is ex ante efficient. Our paper fills the gap by showing that covenants are used as a bondholder governance mechanism in response to aggravated agency conflicts. Our results connect the ex ante design of covenants with the ex post effectiveness of control allocation and suggest that the bond contract is preemptively designed to capture the ex-post efficiency. Second, our paper's results shed some light on the interaction between bondholder and shareholder governance. As a bondholder governance mechanism, covenants can benefit shareholders by reducing their borrowing cost, which increases with stronger shareholder control.
Our paper is also related the literature that studies the relation between bond yields and corporate governance (see, among others, Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Cremers, Nair, and Wei, 2007; Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2005; Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam, 2009 ).
The literature shows that the bond yield generally increases (falls) when the bondholdershareholder relationship deteriorates (ameliorates). Our results complement these findings and indicate that the use of covenants helps to reduce bond yields when the agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders become more acute. We use a comprehensive covenant protection index rather than individual covenants. Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007) show that individual categories of covenants help to mitigate the potential conflict between the firm's shareholders and creditors in the event of mergers and acquisitions. Our paper stresses the importance of using an overall covenant index that covers 15 categories, as theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that different types of bond covenants are in fact interrelated (Smith and Warner, 1979; Billett, King, and Mauer, 2007) .
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes data and summary statistics.
Section 3 presents our baseline results, and their robustness is studied in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the endogeneity issue and presents results that mitigate the concern. Section 6 examines the effect of blockholding on different types of covenants, and Section 7 discusses the effect of investor type on covenant protection. Section 8 investigates the effect of covenants on bond yields. Section 9 concludes the paper. Additionally, the time series pattern in our sample is almost identical to that in the FISD universe. Thus, bond issues in our sample is quite representative of those in the FISD universe in term of covenant information. Table 1 describes the bond issues for our initial sample. The average offering yield is 7.27%. Comparing the yield of a bond issue to the yield of U.S. Treasury bonds of similar maturity, we find that the average yield spread is 1.75%. The average bond issue has an offering amount of $378.52 million and a maturity of 12.66 years, and more than 96% of the issues are senior bonds. We create a set of issue-level dummy variables, which indicate whether the bond is callable, puttable, or convertible. We find that more than half of the bond issues are callable, while the percentage of puttable and convertible bonds is relatively small. We also extract from FISD a bond's credit ratings on the offering date. For issues that do not have ratings at issuance, we search for ratings issued within 1 year of the offering date.
Among those ratings, we first choose the rating immediately prior to issuance, and, if no prior ratings exist, we then use the earliest post-issuance rating. To approximate outside shareholder control, we construct two measures related to institutional blockholding. The first measure, NL5, is the percentage of shares owned by all institutional equity holders who hold no less than 5% of total shares outstanding. The second measure, TOP5, is the percentage of shares held by the five largest institutional investors.
We use institutional blockholding, rather than total institutional ownership, because it better reflects the effective monitoring by institutional investors. While concentrated institutional holding represents greater incentives and ability to influence the firm's decisions and thus better aligns the shareholder-manager interest, aggregate institutional ownership may not result in such an alignment. Institutions with minor stakes have little incentive to be involved in firm-specific decisions, a situation which leads to the free-rider problem pointed out Grossman and Hart (1980) . Table 2 provides summary statistics for the three key variables. As shown in Table 2 , half of the bond issues have covenants in 3-6 categories, while the median number of covenants is 4. Top-five institutions own an average of 21.3% of outstanding shares, and the average holding is 12% for blockholders who own at least 5% of the firm.
2 These 15 categories of covenants are grouped as follows. Two categories of payout restrictions limit a firm's ability to pay dividends and repurchase shares. Three categories of investment restrictions include clauses on the investment policy, asset sale, and merger. Seven categories of financing restrictions are concerned with funded debt, subordinated debt, senior debt, secured debt, total leverage, sale & leaseback, and stock issuance. The last three categories are event-driven covenants, including rating and net worth triggers, poison put, and cross-default clauses.
Firm-Level Accounting Variables and Other Controls
We match bond issues to the issuers' accounting data in Compustat via the historical CUSIP table. For each issue, we first find the fiscal year in which the bond offering date falls and label it as Year 0. We then extract firm-level accounting information at the end of (fiscal) Year −1.
Previous studies document that leverage, firm size, growth options, and debt maturity are important determinants of bond covenants. We construct empirical measures for these firm characteristics. To measure a firm's leverage, we compute the ratio of the book value of longterm debt to the sum of the book value of long-term debt and the market value of equity, where the market value of equity is equal to the product of the fiscal year-end share price and shares outstanding. To account for changes in the long-term debt that take place between the end of Year −1 and the offering date, we adjust the leverage ratio in the following way.
First, we add the amount of new issues in FISD to the level of long-term debt at the end of Year −1. We then subtract any existing bond issues that were long-term at the end of Year -1 and would have become shot-term at the offering date. Finally, we deduct the amount of existing issues that are redeemed between the end of Year −1 and the offering date. We measure growth options by the market-to-book asset ratio, where the market value of assets equals the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of net sales, and short-term debt is approximated by debt in current liabilities, divided by total assets. The debt in current liabilities includes short-term notes and the current portion of long-term debt. Additionally, our empirical regressions control for firm profitability, as captured by the EBIT-to-assets ratio, and asset tangibility, as defined by the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. Table 2 displays the summary statistics of these accounting variables. To mitigate the impact of outliers, we winsorize all firm-level accounting variables and the blockholding measures at the top and bottom 1 percentiles. Table 2 is a credit premium variable, which captures the interest rate conditions at the time of issuance. 3 We define the credit premium as the difference in average yields of BBB and AAA corporate bonds. Bond yields are retrieved from the Federal Reserve Economic Database. We match each bond issue with the credit premium in the month prior to the offering date. Table 2 shows that, on average, BBB bonds yield 89.3 base points higher than AAA bonds in the sample period.
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Baseline Results
In this section, we empirically examine the relationship between the level of covenant protection and institutional blockholding. We see a clear positive relation between covenant protection and blockholding in Figures 3 and 4 , where we plot the average value of the covenant index against different deciles of the blockholding measures. Except for the first decile of the Top5 blocking measure, we observe that the index of covenant protection increases when institutional blockholding increases. The preceding analysis suggests that bondholders demand more covenant protection as the firm's ownership becomes more concentrated among outside institutional blockholders. To further explore the relationship between covenant protection and shareholder rights, we turn now to the multivariate regression analysis.
In Tables 3 and 4 , we investigate the effect of institutional blockholding on the level of covenant protection, where the institutional blockholding is measured by NL5 and Top5 variables respectively. In all empirical regressions, we adjust standard errors by the firm-level clustering and report t-statistics accordingly. Our empirical results for all regression models are very similar in both tables. The model in column 1 is a simple linear regression with NL5 as the only explanatory variable. The model reinforces the preceding descriptive results that institutional blockholding has a significantly positive effect on the covenant protection. Take the blockholding measure NL5 as an example. Its coefficient is 3.113, with a t-statistic equal to 9.00. A one standard deviation increase in blockholdings raises the covenant index by 0.4, and this increase accounts for 10% of the median covenant index, given the sample median value of 4.
Previous studies identify firm size, leverage, growth options, and debt maturity as important determinants of bond covenants. In column 2, we control for these covenant determinants, as well as additional firm characteristics and macroeconomic conditions. For large firms, where information is readily available and reputation is both established and reviewed often, the cost of explicit covenants exceeds any possible benefits (Malitz, 1986) . Using log sales as a proxy for firm size, we find that larger firms tend to use fewer restrictive covenants. We also find that a few other previously identified determinants significantly affect the covenant index in our sample. For instance, firms with a higher market-leverage ratio have more covenant restrictions in their bond contracts, suggesting that bondholders demand more covenant protection because of default concerns. Short-term debt significantly reduces the usage of covenants, implying that short-term bonds could ease agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders (Myers, 1977; Billett, King, and Mauer, 2007) .
We also control for firm profitability, asset tangibility, and the credit premium. Higher profitability may escalate agency concerns over free cash flows. In such an situation, bond covenants help to mitigate the agency costs by disciplining the manager. Consistent with the agency view, our results in column 2 show that profitability has a significantly positive effect on the use of covenants. Unlike leverage, tangible assets could mitigate default concerns on the firm's bond issues. Indeed, the results in column 2 demonstrate that fewer covenant restrictions are observed for issuers with more fixed assets. The credit premium is used to control aggregate economic conditions during the bond issuance. The significantly negative coefficient on the credit premium suggests that higher returns on the credit market lower the level of covenant protection. Controlling for all above firm characteristics and the measure for macroeconomic conditions, we find that institutional blockholding is still positive and significant at the 1% level.
In column 3, we further control for issue-level characteristics: the natural log of issue size, maturity, and whether the bond has an embedded call, put, or conversion option. With other things equal, bond issues with larger size and shorter maturity tend to have more covenants.
Callable bonds tend to have more protection, while the opposite holds for puttable and convertible bonds. As we sequentially increase control variables in the regressions in Tables 3 and 4, the coefficient on institutional blockholding always remains positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the level of covenant protection increases as institutional blockholders accumulate more shares.
In column 4 of Tables 3 and 4, we further control for credit ratings of the bond issues.
The results show that the effect of blockholding on covenant protection is largely reduced both in terms of magnitude and the level of statistical significance when we control for the investment-grade dummy variable. The attenuated effect of institutional blockholding is expected, because such covenant determinants as agency conflicts would already be factored in by rating agencies in their evaluation of the credit risk of a bond issue. Once ratings are controlled for, the incremental effect of institutional blockholding is thus weakened. We confirmed our conjecture by running a probit regression of the investment-grade dummy. The explanatory variables include institutional blockholding and the same set of issue-level, firm-level, and macro-level control variables as in Tables 3 and 4 . Untabulated results show that, for both blockholding measures, the coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level. In addition, the pseudo R-squares of the probit regressions are 0.48, and the model correctly classifies the bonds' ratings for about 84% of the observations. These results suggest that the agency conflict is an important determinant of bond ratings. As institutional blockholding increases, a proxy for increasing shareholder control and, thus, more severe bondholder-shareholder conflicts, the bond is less likely to be rated above the investment grade.
In the last column of Tables 3 and 4 , we add an interaction term between institutional blockholding and the investment-grade dummy, which allows us to differentiate the effect of block ownership between bonds with different credit ratings. Take the result in Table 3 as an example. The coefficient on NL5 is −0.068 and statistically insignificant. This implies that, for non-investment-grade bonds, institutional blockholding does not have a significant effect on covenant protection. The coefficient on the interaction term is 1.333 and significant at the 5% level. Combining the preceding two estimates, we find that the effect of blockholding on covenant protection is equal to 1.265 for investment-grade bonds. In addition, the joint hypothesis test shows that this positive effect is significant at the 1% level. The result in column 5 of Table 3 demonstrates that institutional blockholding has a significantly positive effect on covenant protection for investment-grade bonds, but the effect becomes insignificant for non-investment-grade bonds. The same conclusion can be drawn in column 5 of Table 4 , where we use Top5 as a measure for institutional blockholding. Thus, the results in column 5 of both Table 3 and Table 4 shows that the attenuated effect of institutional blockholding in column 4 is mainly driven by the fact that block ownership has an insignificant effect for non-investment-grade bonds. Bond ratings certainly incorporate the information on agency conflicts inherent in a bond issuer. Institutional blockholding is unlikely to have a great impact on bond covenants in the presence of ratings, especially for junk bonds where default concerns aggravate the potential agency conflicts. Hence, we do not use the bond rating dummy in subsequent regressions.
Robustness Checks
In this section, we present a variety of robustness checks for our baseline results. In Table 5, we first examine whether our results are robust to alternative model specifications. We argued that institutional blockholding, rather than total institutional shareholding, better reflects the effective monitoring by institutional investors. Our baseline results in Tables 3   and 4 showed that, as institutional blockholding increases, the enhanced shareholder control intensifies bondholder concerns, and thus more covenant protection is observed in the debt contract. As a robustness check, we take into account the possibility that total institutional ownership also could capture agency conflicts indirectly and thus influence the covenant design. Consider two firms, H and L, with the same level of block ownership. Yet, Firm L has a much lower total institutional shareholding than Firm H. If blockholders are perceived as having superior or insider information, then the fact that Firm L has much lower institutional ownership by other minority shareholders may indicate that it is opaque and has more powerful blockholders. Thus, bondholders are more concerned about lending to Firm L than to Firm H. Our primary measures of institutional blockholding do not distinguish these two types of firms, as they have the same level of block ownership. To differentiate agency conflicts inherent in these two types of firms, we construct an alternative measure of ownership concentration, based on the Herfindahl index of institutional shareholding. In particular, our Herfindahl index variable is equal to the sum of squares of all institutional investors'
shareholding. This variable better captures ownership concentration among all institutiona investors and will have a larger value for Firm L compared to Firm H.
Using the alternative measure of ownership concentration, we present the regression results in column 1 of Table 5 . The coefficient on Herfindahl index is positive and significant at the 1% level. This result is similar to those we obtained using the two primary blockholding measures, and reinforces our conclusion that covenant protection increases with more concentrated institutional ownership. In untabulated regressions, we also augment Model 3 in both Table 3 and Table 4 by including total institutional ownership in addition to blockholding.
Conditional on NL5 and other control variables, the coefficient on total institutional shareholding is negative but insignificant. This coefficient is very close to zero and insignificant in the regression involving Top5.
In columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 , we employ ordered probit models to accommodate the categorical and ordered nature of our dependent variable, the covenant index. The ordered probit models better capture the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, but at the extra cost of assuming a normally distributed error term. The results show that the estimated coefficients on all regressors are qualitatively the same as the baseline results for Model 3 in Tables 3 and 4 . Both measures of blockholdings are positive and significant at the 1% level after controlling for the full set of bond-, firm-, and macro-level variables.
In Table 6 , we investigate whether our main results are robust to different data structure.
Our baseline regressions are at the issue level. In our sample, it is common for firms to offer multiple bond issues, even in the same year. Over the entire sample period, the average (median) number of issues for a firm is 9.86 (5). Among the firms issuing multiple bonds, the average (median) number of days between two consecutive issues is 657.80 (330) days.
Within a year, the average (median) number of issues offered by a firm is 1.78 (1), and, among multiple-bond issuers, the average (median) number of days between two consecutive offerings is 97.37 (83) days. To examine whether our main results hold at the firm level, we first collapse all bond issues in the same fiscal year into one observation by calculating the weighted averages for the covenant index and the institutional blockholding variables.
The weight is an issue's offering size as a percentage of the total amount of bonds issued in the same fiscal year. We then regress the weighted-average covenant index on the weightedaverage blockholding, controlling for firm accounting variables at the end of fiscal Year −1 and the average credit premium over fiscal Year 0. The first two columns of Table 6 report the firm-year regressions. We find that both measures of institutional blockholding have a positive and highly significant effect on the covenant index.
The results in columns 1 and 2 are consistent with the interpretation that higher ownership concentration aggravates agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders, and thus leads to more covenant protection in the bond contract. Alternatively, one may interpret the results as being driven by the persistence in bond covenants. Suppose that there are two groups of firms initially. One group has more covenants, and the other group has less.
If covenants help to reduce the cost of financing, blockholders may prefer to hold stocks of those firms that use more covenants. If the use of covenants is persistent, firms with more covenants initially tend to have more covenants in their subsequent bond issues. Thus, firms with a large (small) number of covenants will attract more (fewer) blockholders in subsequent years when they offer new bonds. Pooling all years together for the two groups of firms, we are likely to find a positive effect of blockholding on covenants. However, this positive effect is mainly due to the persistence of covenants, rather than to the agency conflicts. To alleviate this concern, we re-run the firm-year regressions by including only the first year's information for each firm, and present the estimation results in columns 3 and 4. The results of the pure cross-sectional regressions confirm a significantly positive effect of blockholding on covenant protection, lending additional support for the interpretation of agency conflicts.
Endogeneity
In this section, we examine whether the endogeneity of institutional blockholding would explain away our main results. The endogeneity issue arises if institutional blockholding is simultaneously determined by bond covenants. This occurs when blockholders can anticipate the covenant structure of a bond issue and make share-trading decisions by incorporating their anticipation. The endogeneity concern is also present due to an omitted-variable problem. Demiroglu and James (2010) show that the tightness of financial covenants is related to ex post improvement in the borrower's covenant variable and declines in investment spending and net debt issuance. Their results suggest that firms use tight covenants to signal private information concerning their future performance. In the meantime, institutional blockholders, as sophisticated investors, may also possess insider information regarding firms' prospects. Thus, unobserved information is an omitted variable that affects both blockholding and the tightness of covenants, rendering institutional blockholding an endogenous explanatory variable.
We address the endogeneity problem in two ways. First, we examine whether the anticipation issue renders institutional blockholding endogenous. If blockholding is affected by the anticipation of the structure of bond covenants, we should observe notable changes in blockholding prior to bond offerings and expect the changes to explain the covenant structure of the bond issues. In our sample, however, the change in blockholding from the second to the first quarter before bond offerings has an average of only 0.21% for NL5 and 0.26% for Top5. Comparing the sample average of 12% for NL5 and 21.3% for Top5, we see that the changes in blockholding are insubstantial. In Table 7 , we investigate whether the changes in blockholding prior to bond offerings explain the restrictiveness of covenants. In all regressions, the change in blockholding has an insignificant coefficient. The preceding results suggest that blockholders are unlikely to trade shares in anticipation of the covenant structure of a future bond issue.
Next, we run instrumental-variable regressions in Table 8 to further mitigate the endogeneity concern. We use stock liquidity as an instrument variable for institutional blockholding.
This can be justified on the basis of the following arguments. First, previous theoretical work and empirical evidence show that liquidity has a direct effect on institutional blockholding.
Liquidity reduces transaction cost, making it easier for blockholders to accumulate or sell large blocks of shares. In theoretical models of Maug (1998) and Edmans (2009) , liquidity induces the initial formation of block ownership. The empirical finding of Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2013) shows that liquidity increases the probability of activist hedge funds acquiring a large block of shares in a firm.
Second, liquidity is unlikely to have a direct effect on the covenants of debt contract. The bond security is relatively illiquid in nature, so that bond contracting terms are unlikely determined by stock liquidity. Therefore, stock liquidity only affects the use of bond covenants indirectly through its influence on shareholder governance. Maug (1998) demonstrates that liquidity encourages blockholders to intervene because it enables them to purchase additional shares at a price that does not reflect the gains from intervention. Thus, liquidity is good for shareholder governance as it allows blockholders to benefit from monitoring through informed trading. Edmans (2009) and Edmans and Manso (2011) argue that liquidity induces information acquisition and facilitates blockholder trading. Selling shares by blockholders can exert downward pressure on the stock price, hurting the manager ex post if he has equity interest in the firm. Ex ante, liquidity is a shareholder governance that controls the manager through the threat of blockholder exit. Although the specific mechanisms differ in the previous two strands of research, a general conclusion is that liquidity has a beneficial effect on shareholder governance. Enhanced shareholder control may aggravate bondholder concerns on agency conflicts, which leads to more covenant protection in the bond contract.
Thus, liquidity affects the use of bond covenants only through the presence of institutional blockholdings.
The above two properties of liquidity validates its candidacy for the instrument variable.
In this paper, we construct two empirical measures for liquidity. The first measure, turnover, is defined as the ratio of the daily trading volume to shares outstanding, averaged over all trading days in the first fiscal year prior to the bond offering date. A stock's turnover should be positively related to its liquidity. Following Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) and Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009), we construct our second liquidity measure, non-zero returns, as the proportion of non-zero daily returns in the first fiscal year before the offering date. Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) argue that if the value of an information signal is insufficient to outweigh transaction costs, market participants will choose not to trade, resulting in an observed zero return. Thus, the proportion of non-zero returns is negatively related to transaction costs and positively related to liquidity.
Using the two liquidity measures as instruments, we report the two-stage least square regressions in Table 8 . We present the first-stage regressions in columns 1 and 3, and the second-stage regressions in columns 2 and 4. Both turnover and non-zero returns variables have positive and significant effects on institutional blockholding. This suggests that stock market liquidity reduces transaction costs, making it easier for blockholders to trade more shares. In the second-stage regressions, we see that the coefficients on both blockholding measures are still significantly positive. The effects of blockholding are even larger than those observed in our baseline OLS regressions. Thus, endogeneity does not seem to explain away our results, and the instrument-variable estimations even strengthen our main findings.
The Effect of Blockholding on Different Types of Covenants
In this section, we refine the covenant index variable and further examine the effect of blockholding on different types of covenants. The covenant index covers 15 different categories of covenants, among which we focus further on two groups. The first group of covenant categories include restrictions on payouts and investment activities, and the second group comprises restrictions on financing activities. Although the 15 covenant categories are all interrelated, the correlations vary among different groups of covenant categories. For instance, Billett, King, and Mauer (2007) find that positive correlations tend to be the largest within the broader categories of payout restrictions, investment restrictions, and financing restrictions.
Payout restrictions contain two categories of covenants. They limit dividend payments of the issuer or a subsidiary of the issuer, and confine the issuer's freedom to repurchase shares.
Thus, covenants restricting payouts are designed to protect bondholders from possible wealth transfer, and to help mitigate the underinvestment problem since a dividend restriction prohibits the distribution of free cash to shareholders (Myers, 1977; Nash, Netter, and Poulsen, 2003) . Investment restrictions include three covenant categories. Investment policy restrictions prevent risky investments made by the issuer and/or subsidiary. Asset sale clauses limit the issuer's ability to sell assets or confine the issuer's use of the proceeds from the sale of assets. A merger restriction specifies that a consolidation or merger of the issuer with another firm is restricted. Thus restrictions on investment activities are put in place to alleviate bondholder concerns with the asset substitution problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Nash, Netter, and Poulsen, 2003) . In summary, by restricting payouts and investment activities, the first group of covenant categories directly prevent bondholders from being expropriated by shareholders.
The second group has seven covenant categories, restricting financing activities. The first four categories limit the issuance of additional debt. They include restrictions on issuance of any debt with initial maturity of one year or longer and restrictions on issuing additional subordinate, senior, and secured debt. The total leverage test clauses restrict total indebtedness of the issuer and/or require the issuer to maintain a specified minimum net worth or ratio of earning to fixed charges. A sale-leaseback covenant restricts the issuer and/or its subsidiary from selling and simultaneously leasing back assets, where the lease agreement represents senior liabilities to the firm. Finally, the stock issue restriction prohibits the issuer and/or its subsidiary from issuing additional common or preferred stock. To summarize, financing restrictions are mainly designed to mitigate claim dilution.
The preceding analysis shows that the two groups of covenants are related in different ways to agency conflicts between bondholders and shareholders. Unlike financing restrictions, payout and investment restrictions are designed to directly address shareholder-bondholder conflicts. Thus, covenants restricting payouts and investment activities should depend more on institutional blockholding, while financing-related covenants are less affected by concentrated institutional ownership. To test this conjecture, we regress different groups of covenants on institutional blockholding and firm-, issue-, and macro-level control variables. Table 9 present the regression results. The dependent variables in the first two columns are the number of covenants restricting payouts and investment, the dependent variables in columns 3 and 4 are the number of financing-related covenants. As expected, both blockholding measures have positive and significant effects on the number of covenants restricting payouts and investment activities, while neither of them has a significant impact on the number of financing-related covenants.
The Differential Effects of Institutional Blockholding
In the preceding baseline models, we investigated the effect of institutional blockholding on the level of covenant protection for bondholders. In theory, two conflicting effects are at work.
On the one hand, institutional blockholders can effectively monitor the management and force them to take value-enhancing actions (Barclay and Holderness, 1992; Huddart, 1993) . Thus, there is less need for bond covenants, because efficient monitoring provides shared benefits to bondholders. On the other hand, concentrated outside ownership (blockholding) better aligns the management to shareholders, which can aggravate the agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Intensified agency concerns cause bondholders to demand more protection via covenants. Our results so far show that institutional blockholding has a positive impact on the restrictiveness of bond covenants, suggesting that ex ante, agency concerns dominate the shared-benefits effect. In this section, we further examine whether agency concerns are the main channel through which institutional blockholding heightens the covenant protection. To this end, we classify institutional investors into different types and investigate whether the positive effect of blockholding is more pronounced among the type of institutions for whom the shareholder-bondholder conflicts are more likely to occur ex-post.
The Effects of Institutional Blockholder Activism
If institutional blockholding affects the covenant protection mainly through the channel of agency conflicts, then this effect should be stronger for more active institutional investors. This is because active institutional blockholders are expected to be more engaged and involved in firms' decision-making, presumably leading to more severe bondholder-shareholder conflicts. To empirically test this hypothesis, we follow Smith (1988, 1994) and Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005) and classify institutions into two groups: potentially active investors and potentially passive investors. The active group includes investment companies, independent investment advisors, corporate pension funds, public pension funds, and university and foundation endowments; the passive group includes banks and insurance companies. Detailed information on institutional investor type is provided by Professor Brian Bushee. 4 We then calculate our institutional blockholding measures separately among active and passive institutional investors. Specifically, for all investors whose holdings are used to calculate the NL5 and Top5 blockholding measures, we split them into active and passive groups and re-calculate the two blockholding measures among each group. Finally, we jointly examine the effects of blockholding among active and passive institutional investors and report estimation results in Table 10 . 5 All specifications indicate that the effect of institutional blockholding among active investors is positive and significant, while the effect of institutional blockholding among passive investors is either negative or insignificantly positive. The signs of coefficients on all control variables remain the same as they are in the baseline regression models. These results suggest that bondholders are more concerned about lending to firms with concentrated ownership among active blockholders, and thus, in equilibrium, bondholders retain more control rights to protect their own interests.
The Effects of Investors' Investment Horizons
While institutional blockholding aligns the management to shareholders, we hypothesize that the severity of potential conflicts between shareholders and bondholders depends on the investment horizons of institutional blockholders. To verify our hypothesis, we examine whether institutional investors' investment horizons have different effects on the severity of the agency conflicts and, in turn, on the extent of covenant protection. Following Bushee (2001) Similar to what we did in Section 7.1, we calculate institutional blockholding measures separately for long-term and short-term institutional investors and jointly examine their effects on covenant protection. The estimation results are reported in Table 11 . 6 Across all regression models, the effect of institutional blockholding among short-term investors is positive and significant at the 1% level, while the effect of blockholding among long-term institutional investors is mostly insignificant. Comparing the effects of both types of investors, we see that the positive effect on the covenant protection is much larger for short-term investors than for long-term investors. Thus, our findings imply that bondholders demand more control rights when lending to firms with more concentrated short-term institutional investors. This may result from the fact that short-term shareholders are more likely to engage in opportunistic activities, such as taking on short-run and high-risk projects, which could be detrimental to bondholders (Leland, 1994; Ju and Ou-Yang, 2006) . Our findings also suggest that longterm relationships help to mitigate agency conflicts between bondholders and shareholders (Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . 6 We exclude quasi-indexers in our analysis, because they are less likely to make independent holding decisions. The results are qualitatively the same if we include blockholding by quasi-indexers as an additional control variable. We see that the effect of blockholding among short-term investors is significantly positive and is also the largest if we further control for blockholding by quasi-indexers.
The Effects of Covenants on Yield Spreads
We have shown that more concentrated ownership intensifies bondholder concerns on agency conflicts, leading to more covenants in bond contracts. Exposed to the potential agency problem, bondholders can also charge a higher yield to compensate themselves when lending to a firm. Since bond covenants are a mechanism to control the inherent agency problem in lending, we would expect that the proper use of covenants can help attenuate the effect of agency conflicts on bond yields. We examine the effect of covenants on yield spreads in the last part of our empirical analysis.
We first investigate how blockholding affects the yield spread of a bond, where yield spread is computed as the offering yield minus the yield of U.S. Treasury bonds with similar maturity. We regress yield spreads on institutional blockholding plus other firm-, issue-, and macro-level control variables, and present the results in columns 1 and 4 of Table 12. The coefficients on both blockholding measures are positive, suggesting that the number of covenants increases with intensified agency conflicts. We augment the first set of regressions with the covenant index and its interaction with blockholding measures. The parameter of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term, which captures the differential effect of blockholding on covenants for bond issues with different number of covenants. We see in columns 2 and 5 that, for both blockholding measures, the coefficients on the interaction term are negative, and the coefficient on Top5 ×Covenant is significant at the 5% level. These results suggest that although bondholder concerns on agency conflicts increase the yield spreads, this effect is smaller if more covenants are present in the bond contracts. In columns 3 and 6, we further interact the product of blockholding and covenants with the investment-grade dummy. We find that the effect of covenants on yields differs for bonds with different credit ratings. The positive effect of blockholding on yield spreads is reduced by covenants, significantly more so for investment-grade bonds than for non-investment-grade bonds. Overall, our results in Table 12 suggest that covenants help to alleviate the impact of agency conflicts on yield spreads, and the beneficial effect of covenants is stronger for investment-grade bonds.
Conclusion
Bond covenants are designed ex ante to address ex post agency conflicts. In this paper, we show empirically that the agency concern is significant in shaping the structure of bond covenants. Larger institutional blockholdings align the management to shareholders, aggravating bondholder concerns on ex post agency conflicts. Thus, bondholders retain more contingent control rights by including more restrictive covenants in the bond contracts. Consistent with this hypothesis, this paper's empirical results show that more covenants are incorporated in corporate bonds issued by firms with higher institutional blockholdings. This positive effect is robust to different measures of blockholding and alternative regression models. Using stock liquidity as an instrument, we find that the effect of blockholding is still positive and becomes even stronger in two-stage least square regressions. We also find that the positive effect of institutional blockholding on covenant protection is more pronounced for bond issuers whose ownership is more concentrated among active and short-term investors. This bolsters our conjecture that institutional blockholding increases covenant protection through the channel of agency conflicts. While covenants enhance bondholder governance, they can also benefit shareholders by reducing the firm's borrowing cost. Consistent with this view, we find that covenants help to reduce yield spreads that are related to bondholder concerns on agency conflicts. The sample consists of public bonds issued in the period 1979-2008 by U.S. firms that have information on institutional ownership. Issuers' accounting variables are measured at the end of first fiscal year prior to the issuance date. The covenant index variable summarizes protection for bondholders in 15 categories, and The total possible number of covenants for a bond ranges from 0 to 15. The NL5 investors variable is the percentage of shares owned by all institutional blockholders, who hold no less than 5% of total shares outstanding. The Top5 investors variable is the percentage of shares held by the five largest institutional investors. Leverage is the book value of long-term debt divided by the sum of the book value of long-term debt and the market value of equity, where the book value of long-term debt is adjusted for changes in the long-term debt that take place between the end of Fiscal Year −1 and the offering date. Credit premium is the difference in average yields of BBB and AAA corporate bonds. The two blockholding measures and all accounting variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percentiles. The dependent variable is the bond covenant index summarizing protection for bondholders in 15 categories. The total possible number of covenants for a bond ranges from 0, representing the least protection, to 15, representing the greatest protection. The NL5 investors variable is the percentage of shares owned by all institutional blockholders, who hold no less than 5% of total shares outstanding.
Other explanatory variables are defined in Section 2. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firmlevel clustering, and the corresponding t-statistics are presented in parentheses. * * * , * * and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) The dependent variable is the bond covenant index summarizing protection for bondholders in 15 categories. The total possible number of covenants for a bond ranges from 0, representing the least protection, to 15, representing the greatest protection. The Top5 investors variable is the percentage of shares held by the five largest institutional investors. Other explanatory variables are defined in Section 2. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering, and the corresponding tstatistics are presented in parentheses. * * * , * * and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) The dependent variable is the bond covenant index summarizing protection for bondholders in 15 categories. The total possible number of covenants for a bond ranges from 0, representing the least protection, to 15, representing the greatest protection. The NL5 long-term (short-term) investors variable is the percentage of shares owned by long-term (short-term) institutional blockholders who hold no less than 5% of total shares outstanding. The Top5 long-term (short-term) investors variable is the percentage of shares owned by long-term (short-term) institutional blockholders who are among the 5 largest shareholders. Long-term (short-term) investors are dedicated (transient) institutions as defined in Bushee (2001) and Bushee and Noe (2000) . Other explanatory variables are defined in Section 2. Robust standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering, and the corresponding t-statistics are presented in parentheses. * * * , * * and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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